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Among the insights in commentaries to our article was the valuable suggestion that 
cryptomarkets serve a particular subpopulation of drug buyers; whatever harm-reducing 
outcomes they generate may simultaneously reproduce drug-related inequalities. We 
caution against generalising our arguments to other online purchasing locations and 






We thank the authors of the four commentaries (1-4) for their critical and fruitful 
engagement with our question: “Will growth in cryptomarket drug buying increase the 
harms of illicit drugs?”  
 
Van der Gouwe and Brunt (4) in their commentary suggest that our analysis could be 
extended to include all internet-facilitated drug sourcing, including clearnet webshops 
and drug discussion forums. While we certainly see value in such an exercise, these other 
online locations will have different characteristics and therefore, different effects to 
cryptomarkets. Importantly, our arguments cannot and should not be generalised to 
virtual platforms that lack the third-party services unique to cryptomarkets – including 
payment escrow and dispute resolution. Future research examining the harms and 
benefits connected to various marketplace types must also carefully distinguish among 
online as well as offline market subtypes, including buying from friends, known and 
unknown dealers.  
 
Whether or not the cryptomarket drug trade continues to grow, Sumnall (1) suggests that 
there is no guarantee that the potential harms and benefits as detailed in our assessment 
will continue in future. This observation is valuable. Sumnall points to cyptomarket 
mechanisms that facilitate trust via customer feedback on purchases as one variable in 
our equation for estimating harms and benefits that may falter. We would add that law 
enforcement activity aimed at degrading trust (5) may similarly impact on harms and 
benefits. 
 
Even if cryptomarkets serve to reduce some drug-related harms, it is possible that they 
may function to reproduce, or indeed exacerbate, drug related inequalities. Sumnall 
points to our suggestion that cryptomarket buyers do not fit the profile of drug users with 
the most harmful patterns of use. As with independent drug checking services (6) that 
primarily cater to recreational drug users, cryptomarket drug buying seems likely 
disproportionately to exclude from its benefits those most likely to experience drug 
harms. Martin (2) makes a similar observation in connection to the potential for 
cryptomarkets to reduce violence. To the extent that these platforms predominantly 
serve buyers of drugs like MDMA and cannabis, typically sold in markets in which 
systemic violence is already relatively rare, cryptomarkets may have limited impact in 
reducing violence where its effects are most problematic.  
 
Martin’s aptly termed ‘gentrification hypothesis’, however, suggests that cryptomarkets 
may, for some less commonly sold substances like methamphetamine, alter supply 
networks. Recent evidence in the Australian context is compelling. Australian 
cryptomarket prices were found to be significantly lower than offline prices for 
methamphetamine, but this difference was not observed for cannabis, cocaine and 
ecstasy (7). The disproportionate involvement of organised criminal groups with an 
established reputation for violence in Australian methamphetamine markets may have 
functioned to increase the comparative risk – and therefore price – for offline sourced 
methamphetamine, consistent with Reuter and Kleiman’s ‘risk and prices’ framework (8). 
To the extent that cryptomarkets facilitate anonymity and physical separation among 
buyers, sellers and other drug market actors, Martin encourages us not to ‘write off minor 
reductions in systemic violence as inconsequential’ (p. X).  
 
Mounteney and colleagues (3) encourage us to be wary of the term ‘drug quality’ with its 
positive connotations in connection to product safety, and here we concur. It was for this 
reason that we sought to specify how vendor accountability may function to make 
cryptomarket vendors more likely to sell ‘as advertised’ substances than their offline 
counterparts, and acknowledged that high purity can lead to harmful outcomes like 
overdose (p. X), a problem exacerbated in the absence of knowledge about substance 
content. It is here that we see the potential for the wholesale function of cryptomarkets 
as a double-edged sword in relation to harms and benefits. While customers using these 
platforms to source stock for offline resale may have greater confidence in obtaining 
products with known content and purity than they might when sourcing stock offline, 
their offline customers may not be protected by the same kind of seller accountability 
mechanisms. One possibility might be the intentional sourcing of fentanyl from 
cryptomarkets and then mis-selling it offline as heroin. Research is required to establish 
the extent to which cryptomarkets may be used in this way, given the sharp rise in 
accidental overdoses reported by the National Crime Agency which are thought to be 
linked to fentanyl and its analogues being mixed by dealers with heroin (9).  
 
The joint Europol/EMCDDA publication in November 2017 ‘Drugs and the darknet: 
Perspectives for enforcement, research and policy’ (5) concluded: “In the light of the 
relative ease and convenience of the darknet as a sales channel, it is essential that 
measures are considered to prevent and discourage consumers from using online 
platforms for obtaining drugs.”. We are minded to ask: in favour of what alternative? We 
find here little critical reflection on the implications of law enforcement ‘success’ in the 
form of arrests and marketplace disruption measures. Will drug harms, drug deaths and 
violence as a result of such ‘successes’ be reduced? Or might these be increased? Our 
analysis suggests that the relationship between drug purchasing and harms and benefits 
is complex and dynamic. The need for monitoring and well-designed research is urgent.   
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